| Rethinking "Resistance": Arab Liberal Perspectives |
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This essay will present the broad outlines of this critique and the circumstances of its emergence. Arab liberalism was a force of only marginal importance in the Middle East in the second half of the 20th century, and has only recently regained prominence. A number of factors contributed to this liberal resurgence. First, the decline of the global Left in general and the Arab Left in particular led a number of former Arab Marxists to embrace liberal ideas. Among these are such figures as Hazem Saghieh, Lebanese political editor at Al-Hayat; Tunisian intellectual Lafif Lakhdar; and Syrian intellectual Georges Tarabishi. [1] This phenomenon mirrors (though belatedly) the movement of prominent intellectuals in the West, such as the French historian Francois Furet, from the Marxist camp to liberalism. Yet more significant than the intellectual evolution of specific individuals has been the fact that the eclipse of Marxism in Russia and Eastern Europe and the democratization of much of the Third World has led to a general convergence on the liberal model of progress. Thus, Arab thinkers concerned with modernizing their societies no longer have two competing models of modernity to choose from. [2] Another contributing factor to the liberal resurgence was the attacks of September 11, 2001. The shock of these attacks having emerged from the Arab world provided the impetus for Arab intellectuals, and those in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in particular, to reexamine the foundations of modern Arab society. One Saudi liberal encapsulated this watershed event in the following lines: "Thank you, bin Laden. Were it not for you, we would still be stuck in the 1990s, living in study sessions with Ibn Taymiyya, eating at the table of Ibn Kathir, with our sick forming a queue at Ibn Al-Qayyim's clinic, and looking to Ibn Hanbal for solutions to our civilizational crises." [3] The spread of these new intellectual trends has been facilitated by changes in the structure of the Arab media. The Gulf states, aware of the challenges to their stability presented by both Sunni radicalism and a resurgent Iran, have allowed for a margin of liberal discourse, especially in newspapers like the Kuwaiti Al-Siyassa and Awan and the Saudi Al-Watan. More importantly, these developments have coincided with the burgeoning of electronic media in the Arab world, with the establishment of explicitly liberal websites such as Elaph, [4] Middle East Transparent, [5] Aafaq, [6] Al-Awan, [7] and others. It is the websites in particular that allow a new degree of freedom of expression and help establish networks among writers in different countries, producing a kind of Arab liberal "Republic of Letters." A number of recent events have turned these writers' attention to the issue of Islamist resistance: the war in Iraq, Hamas' electoral victory and subsequent armed coup in Gaza, and Hizbullah's takeover of Beirut. The Arab liberal reaction to these events in part takes aim at these groups' Islamist agenda, but many have gone further and engaged in a comprehensive critique of the concept of "resistance" in Arab society.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a turning point in Arab public life. Just as the 1948 defeat had discredited an earlier generation of Arab nationalists, the 1967 war discredited the "progressive" pan-Arab regimes that both flirted and competed with their most serious domestic opposition, the secular Marxist Left. One way in which this Arab Left responded to the defeat was by calling for a move from conventional warfare to a strategy of popular resistance. A prominent proponent of this approach was the Syrian philosopher Sadik Jalal Al-'Azm. His first two books, Self-Criticism after the Defeat and Critique of Religious Thought, encapsulated the concerns of the Arab Left in the wake of the 1967 defeat. The first book, which gained immediate fame - and was banned in several countries - was a devastating critique of Arab political and religious culture in light of the Arabs' defeat in the war. Al-'Azm pinned the blame for the defeat on the tepid political program of the "progressive" regimes, which had attempted to find a third way between revolutionary socialism and traditional society and values. He argued that this project was a failure, and repeatedly held up the Viet Cong as a role model, urging the wholesale mobilization of the Arab states in support of a "popular war of liberation" against Israel using guerilla tactics. At this point in his career, Al-'Azm was not thought to be a liberal, nor did he consider himself one. In Self-Criticism he wrote: "I have no doubt that the liberal circles that call for a modern Arab society want to make the call to overcome backwardness a substitute for the only surefire Arab response to the expansionist Zionist presence on Arab land - namely, the popular war of liberation." In contrast with the Arab liberals, he argued that these two goals were actually complementary, and not contradictory, since socialist peoples' armies ineluctably use such wars to uproot traditional social structures and modernize their countries. "The individual's participation, direct and indirect, in resistance (muqawama) and the people's war effort leads necessarily to the widening of his horizons. He will grasp that he has a country (watan) and a nation (umma), and not just a tribe and a family…" [8] Al-'Azm thus saw armed resistance and modernization as going hand in hand. It is precisely this argument that would prove less convincing when, from the 1980s on, Islamists began replacing leftists and nationalists as the leaders of the armed conflict with Israel and the West. Rather than revolutionary nationalism, the broadened horizons of which Al-'Azm spoke turned out to be the territorial and historical reaches of political Islam.
Al-'Azm's second book, Critique of Religious Thought, was a logical extension of Self-Criticism after the Defeat: After describing religious doctrine as one of the causes of the defeat, Al-'Azm noted that no one had yet undertaken a systematic critique of the prevailing religious ideology, and then went on to provide his own. He wrote that this was an urgent task not only because religious ideology was the main weapon of reaction against progress, but also because some "progressives" as well had increasingly turned to religion after 1967, whether out of sincere belief or for political benefit. Al-'Azm's analysis may have been prescient in anticipating the Islamist awakening, but it did little to stem the tide. The 1980s and '90s witnessed the progressive displacement of left-wing radicalism and Arab nationalism by Islamism. In Lebanon, Amal and then Hizbullah set up camp in southern Lebanon, where the PLO had formerly held sway. In the Palestinian territories, Hamas began its long ascent, with its "resistance" credentials later strengthened by the PLO's entering into the Oslo Accords. The rise of Islamic resistance movements was buttressed and amplified by the rise of revolutionary Iran, the Afghan jihad, and the wider religious revival. While the Islamist movements have mostly failed in their goal to overthrow the Arab regimes, they have nonetheless succeeded in winning the mantle of "resistance." This development clearly called into question Al-'Azm's assumption that popular guerilla war against Israel would go hand in hand with progress and modernization in the Arab world. These two desires now seemed diametrically opposed, and modernists would have to choose whether to support the Islamists in their fight against Israel and the West or oppose them in the name of secularism and progress. As it was, the decline of the global socialist camp was encouraging reformed leftists and new liberals to see progress as requiring integration into the West and the adoption of its values. The question of the Iraqi resistance has served as a kind of generational acid test for Arab liberals in this regard, gauging the durability of Third-Worldist anti-imperialist motifs in the face of the new liberal critique of resistance. The new Arab liberals differ from an older generation of Arab reformists - including figures like Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim and Gamal Al-Bana - who, while often critical of the Islamists' agenda, have at times been willing to excuse these groups' illiberalism so long as they were fighting Israel or the West. The clearest example of this split within the liberal camp was a polemic that erupted between the Egyptian sociologist Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim, one of the godfathers of the Arab liberal movement, and a number of Iraqi liberals: 'Abd Al-Khaliq Hussein, Hosheng Broka, and Kazem Habib. The dispute centered on a pair of articles Ibrahim wrote in late 2007 on the war in Iraq, in which he advanced a deterministic theory of resistance based on the precedents of Vietnam and Algeria. Ibrahim wrote that no matter what the circumstances of a foreign occupation, the native population will ultimately rise up in arms, and sooner or later the occupiers will leave in defeat. The controversial aspect of the articles was their tone of sympathy for the Iraqi resistance and the comparisons drawn between Al-Qaeda, on the one hand, and such Third-World icons as the Algerian FLN and Ho Chi Minh on the other. Ibrahim's three Iraqi critics all advanced more or less the same objection: that the "resistance" paradigm was not the appropriate framework for assessing the situation in Iraq. While not all of them had supported the initial invasion, they all concurred that the Saddam regime was "fascist" or "racist" and that the main activity of the Iraqi resistance was the murder of innocent civilians. 'Abd Al-Khaliq Hussein pointed to the tribal Awakening movement as a sign that the Iraqis themselves were opposed to the resistance, and both he and Broka argued that none of the leaders of the resistance were actually Iraqi. As Kazem Habib put it, Ibrahim "did not manage to differentiate between a national resistance and the obscurantist forces that want to impose a regime like the Afghan Taliban regime on Iraq…" The harsh tone of this polemic against one of the grand doyens of Arab liberalism was an indication of the salience of the issue and the gulf that had emerged between the older Third-Worldist liberalism and the newer generation of liberal writers. Thus, Habib wrote that Ibrahim had "left behind the fight for human rights, individual freedom, and democracy," and had become a defender of "criminal actions against the Iraqi people." [9]
The modern Arab notion of "resistance" (muqawama) grew out of the fight against Western colonialism and against Israel, in concrete wars with concrete aims. Over time, however, the idea of resistance morphed into a metaphysical concept encompassing the themes of vitality, virility, and regeneration. In his speech celebrating the July 16, 2008 prisoner swap with Israel, Hasan Nasrallah called resistance the true identity of the Middle East's peoples: "I want to emphasize that the true identity of the native, steadfast peoples of this region is the identity of resistance, the will to resistance, the culture of resistance, and the rejection of ignominy and disgrace at the hands of any occupier." [10] The idea that resistance is a weltanschauung unto itself was also recently expressed by Sheikh Na'im Qasim, Hizbullah deputy secretary-general, at a book-signing event for his recently-published volume titled The Resistance Society: Desiring Martyrdom and Producing Victory: "The resistance is not just an armed group that wants to liberate a piece of land, nor is it a contingent tool whose role comes to an end when that which occasioned it does. Rather, the resistance is a vision and a program, and not just a military reaction." [11] A further example of this view of resistance was furnished in an article by Muhammad 'Ali Fakhru, former Bahraini education minister and ambassador to France and Belgium, published in Al-Quds Al-'Arabi on May 15, 2008:
The resistance in Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon are not some event, but rather a vital phenomenon which expresses that which is noble and honorable in the reality of this nation. Thus, when dealing with this phenomenon, one must rise up to its spiritual and moral level. The resistance is an eagle soaring above the mountain crests, and thus those who live like chickens, collecting the remains of worms and crumbs of refuse, are not capable of understanding this greatness that swims in the skies, in the heart of the winds, the storms, and the thunder… [12]
It is equally significant that Fakhru's article, titled "Unjust Criticism of the Resistance," is of an apologetic nature. Written directly in the wake of Hizbullah's takeover of Beirut and after the Awakenings movements decimated Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the defender of the resistance felt that he was himself on the defensive. This is indicative of the fact that the critique of resistance has emerged into the mainstream.
A succinct critique of this resistance weltanschauung was penned by Hazem Saghieh, political editor at the Al-Hayat daily and an influential Arab liberal author. This critique sees the central faults of the resistance as the following: 1) a dualistic worldview; 2) nihilism and glorification of violence; 3) the view of the resistance as an end in itself; and 4) the persistence of the resistance mentality after victory. In what follows, his essay will serve as a framework for the discussion of the Arab liberal perspectives on resistance:
A similar point was put forth by 'Abd Al-Razzaq 'Eid, a Sorbonne-educated Syrian philosopher from Aleppo. He was one of the nine public figures (in addition to parties and organizations) who signed the Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change, the founding document of an umbrella group uniting Syrian dissidents of all persuasions. He characterizes himself as a dissident with respect to both the regime and the opposition; he has also been subjected on occasion to harassment by the security forces. [14] In his December 31, 2007 article on the liberal Middle East Transparent website, written after the arrest of a fellow dissident, 'Eid criticized the Syrian regime's ideology and its model of nationalism, which he describes as "a kind of prattle that has become as obsolete as the tyranny" that created it. (It should be noted that Syria is perhaps the only Arab state to continue to center its official ideology on the theme of resistance.) In 'Eid's view, the Syrian regime's nationalism is hollow because it lacks concepts of true citizenship and a civil, contractual social structure. Instead, it is almost entirely focused on defending a hypothetical domestic unity, in which the part is subjected to the whole, against a foreign enemy - the West and Israel. This is precisely the "resistance" dualism described by Saghie. For 'Eid, the regime "takes as its starting point a conception of society based on the principle of a harmonious and concordant unity of its identity, the purity of whose harmony and concord is only disturbed by the external colonialist imperialist Zionist [enemy]." But this hypothetical unity of identity is not in fact organic, but is rather constructed in opposition to the external enemy. He adduces the Palestinian experience as a kind of prototype for the Arab national experience on the whole; in his view, the Palestinians saw their enemy as an absolute 'other', instead of as a real, historical enemy, and thus were unable or unprepared to learn from their enemies' points of strength. Sadik Jalal Al-'Azm had already written in his Self-Criticism after the Defeat that the Arabs needed to learn from the scientific mentality of their enemies, including Israel. [15] Thus 'Eid, consciously or not, was echoing a classic of Arab autocritique - but with an important addition. He identifies the underlying reason for the Arabs' inability to draw lessons from defeat as their excess of enmity and the tendency to view the conflict in mythic terms - a characterization that could perhaps be applied to Al-'Azm as well. For 'Eid, the corollary of this dualism is the inability to engage in honest introspection. In his view, the various Arab ideologies, whether leftist, pan-Arabist, or Islamist, do not understand that "the principle enemy hunkers within: it is tyranny, ignorance, and corruption in the innermost reaches." Here again we see how 'Eid differs from Al-'Azm: The fight against Israel does not smoothly dovetail with the need for domestic reform; it competes with and obfuscates it. 'Eid warns of the corroding effect this has on Arab societies, breaking them up into "human nebula," held together only by a repressive cult of national security. [16] A more radical version of 'Eid's critique was offered by the Iraqi novelist 'Arif 'Alwan, for whom the contemporary Arab malaise in its entirety is attributable to the Arabs' rejection of the UN Partition Plan in 1947, and their subsequent mythologizing of their defeat as the "nakba." He argues that the "nakba" mentality so entrenched the attitude of rejection of the other that it boomeranged on the Arabs, giving rise to both the Arab dictators and the Islamist terrorists. In his view, this refusal to acknowledge the rights of the other has led to a culture of cruelty, and "the Arabs have no hope of extricating themselves from the cultural and political challenge of terrorism unless they come up with [new] and different [fundamental] premises, and with an outlook completely free of the fetters of the religious ritual that they have devised in modern times and called the nakba." [17] A case-specific treatment of the role of enmity in resistance identity comes in an article by the liberal Yemeni author Elham Mane'a on Hizbullah's May 2008 takeover of Beirut. Addressing Hasan Nasrallah, she wrote: "People like you need an enemy against whom they can resist. They need this badly. Without an enemy there would be no justification for your existence; without him, there would be no more justification for your weapons, which you raise up and say 'we will aim them at the enemy.' At whom did you aim your weapons today, Nasrallah? Whose breast did you pierce? Whose blood did you spill? Was it Lebanon's breast? Lebanon's blood? Lebanon's fate?..." "I ask you Nasrallah… not to resist. Don't resist an enemy you invented…" [18] Like Hazem Saghieh and 'Arif 'Alwan, Mane'a sees the dualist instinct as self-perpetuating: when one's identity becomes inextricably tied to fighting an enemy, eventually one will come to find or invent another enemy rather than disband the resistance.
Basim Al-Ansar, an Iraqi poet living in Denmark, addressed this issue in an article titled "The Death of the Resistance," published in the Elaph e-journal on August 5, 2008. He characterizes the resistance's glorification of violence and nihilism as a case of sadomasochism: "…Victory, in the lexicon of the armed resistance, has something sadistic to it that can absolutely not be ignored. This [sadism] lies in the pleasure taken in torturing the enemy and stealing its life away from it. At the same time, we see that it has a clear masochistic aspect, in the pleasure it takes in the death of some of its members and in its exalting of the concepts of martyrdom and sacrifice…" [20] The Iraq war and the atrocities committed in the name of the resistance greatly amplified the scope of this criticism, to the point where sardonic critique of the Iraqi resistance emerged as something of a subgenre of its own. Thus, Ibrahim Al-Khayr Ibrahim, a Sudanese author, praised the "historic accomplishments" of the "intrepid pan-Arab/Islamist resistance in Iraq" against "those foreign agents: children who let themselves be tempted to ride buses to their schools or candy stores, and adults, male and female, who let themselves be tempted into going to the markets to buy necessities." [21] And the Iraqi author Jamal Al-Khurasan noted that the resistance had turned to blowing up bridges, writing that "bridges have become an enemy to these backwards groups, though the bridges' only crime was to offer a free service to Iraqi citizens - and this is a first-degree crime in the bylaws of the 'resistance'." [22] Likewise, 'Arif 'Alwan opens his article on "the nakba mentality" with a description of Palestinian internecine violence: "When the salafi mob in Gaza tied the hands and feet of a senior Palestinian official and hurled him, alive, from the 14th floor, I asked myself: What political or religious precepts must have been inculcated into the minds of these young people to make them treat a human life with such shocking cruelty?" He continues with an earlier episode from the second intifida: "Earlier, I had watched on TV as the bodies of two Israeli soldiers were thrown from the second floor [of a building] in a Palestinian city… What historic linguistic distortion could have erased from the human heart [all] moral sensibilities when dealing with a living and helpless human being?" This voice of protest against the resistance's glorification of violence can be seen as an implicit critique of Frantz Fanon's theory of redemptive violence, as we will see presently.
It is not clear that Fanon in fact viewed resistance as "an end in itself," but he certainly saw it as having a transformative quality surpassing the simple achievement of formal independence: "Colonialism is the organization of the domination of a nation after military conquest. The war of liberation is not a seeking for reforms but the grandiose effort of a people, which had been mummified, to rediscover its own genius, to reassume its history and assert its sovereignty." [24] Fanon also wrote: "Decolonization… cannot come as a result of magical practices, a natural shock, or a friendly understanding… The naked truth of decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it. For if the last shall be first, this will only come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists." [25] Whether derived from Fanon or not, contemporary Arab proponents of resistance do seem to view it as an end in itself; for Hasan Nasrallah, the resistance is an "identity," [26] and for Fakhru it is a "vital phenomenon." [27] As we saw in our discussion of the liberals' critique of resistance glorification of violence, they doubt that resistance violence is transformative or has any inherent worth. Instead of leading to national regeneration, the resistance mentality perpetuates violence in accordance with its dualistic worldview. In the end, and after the classic liberation struggle has ended, the same violence is invariably employed against fellow citizens who have been stamped as enemies.
Likewise, Basim Al-Ansar writes in his article "The Death of the Resistance": "Victory, in the lexicon of the resistance, has a destructive aspect to it that persists even after the enemy or the occupier has disappeared from the country. This is because it becomes part of the nature of one who believes in it, and he then applies it against members of the collective for whom he claimed to be fighting." [29] The dualistic worldview inherent in resistance is thus responsible for the perpetuation of the resistance mentality even when it no longer serves any rational function. The historical background to the rapid spread of this line of criticism was the events in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iraq in 2007, when a large number of commentators argued that the resistance was not actually fighting a foreign enemy at all - or at least not primarily - and had instead devolved into factional warfare. Even in 2006, some liberal observers had warned that the end goal of Hizbullah's war with Israel, waged six years after the Israeli withdrawal and ostensibly to recover prisoners, was in fact to lend the movement "a nationalist-Islamist halo" so it could march on Beirut as Mussolini had marched on Rome. [30] Shortly after Hizbullah did in fact take over Beirut in the summer of 2008, the journalist Hazem Al-Amin wrote in Al-Hayat:
My purpose here is not to condemn, but simply to look into the fate of the 'resistances' in their capacity as masks for civil wars. What happened in Beirut is the worst instance, but let us look also at Iraq. Is there any doubt that a civil war in that country was tangled up with the 'resistance?' Those of us wanting to find the 'pure' sides of the resistance cannot find a single Iraqi resistance faction that is not, in its definition [of itself], caught up in one of the sides of the civil war. [They] understand resistance as an absolute value, and not as a means or as activities. [31]
A number of factors coalesced to produce a cohesive and widespread liberal Arab critique of the culture of resistance, one of the ideological mainstays of 20th-century Arab political culture. On the geopolitical level, the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Third-Worldist Left have led progressive Arab intellectuals to view the West more as a source of inspiration than as the source of all evil. In parallel, the rise of Islamism in the Arab world, and in particular its assumption of the mantle of resistance, has made the resistance factions unappealing to modernists; the 9/11 attacks and Al-Qaeda's activities in Iraq further sealed this estrangement. In 2007 and 2008 in particular, a spate of internecine fighting erupted in Gaza and Lebanon, with Hamas and Hizbullah both describing this fighting as "resistance," as did the Iraqi factions. The critique that emerged from the confluence of all these factors was given wide distribution through a newly emergent network of Arab liberal electronic media and a handful of liberal-leaning newspapers. How influential is this critique? While liberal intellectuals have certainly made gains in the Arab media in recent years, liberalism has yet to prove itself as an important political force in the Arab world (as demonstrated by the lackluster performance of liberal parties in Kuwait, for instance). On the other hand, the Gulf states and Egypt are more worried about Islamist challenges to their rule (Iran, Al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood) than they are about Israel or the West, and thus the liberal critique dovetails well with their perceived national interest. In the end, though, the principle importance of this critique lies in the fact that it exists and is widespread. This is a measure of the growing degree of pluralism in Arab public life when compared with previous decades, and shows that the Arab liberal movement is starting to come into its own.
* Daniel Lav is the Director of the Middle East and North Africa Reform Project at MEMRI
[1] For Hazem Saghieh see Wael Abu 'Uqsa, "Liberalism and Left in Contemporary Arab Thought: A Study in post-1992 Hazem Saghie Writings," unpublished MA thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007, esp. pp. 32-34; for Lafif Lakhdar, see Menahem Milson, "Lafif Lakhdar: A European Muslim Reformist," MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 314, January 5, 2007, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA31407 ; for Georges Tarabishi, see interview in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, January 23, 2008. For the first of these two, the origin of their disaffection with the left was specifically the civil war in Lebanon. [2] The idea of a general worldwide convergence on liberal democracy was proposed by Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," The National Interest, Summer 1989. [3] Saleh Al-Rashed, "Shukran Bin Laden," www.elaph.com/Web/ElaphWriter/2008/8/355651, August 12, 2008. [4] www.elaph.com. [5] www.middleeasttransparent.com. [6] www.aafaq.org. [7] www.alawan.org. [8] Sadik Jalal Al-'Azm, Al-Naqd al-dhati ba'd al-hazima, Damascus: Dar Mamduh 'Udwan, 2007; pp. 94-5. [9] MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1790, "Iraqi Liberals Attack Egyptian Reformer Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim for Comparing Iraq to Vietnam and Algeria and for Expressing Sympathy for the Resistance," December 21, 2007, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP179007. A comparable controversy erupted when another Egyptian liberal icon, Gamal Al-Bana, published an article on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks calling the suicide-pilots "extremely courageous" and portraying the attacks as America's just desserts for its foreign policy. This article stood in stark contrast to Al-Bana's Islamic liberalism and his habitual sharp criticism of Islamists far less extreme than Al-Qaeda; here, as in the case of Ibrahim, it appears that the classic Third-Worldist resentment of U.S. power trumped opposition to Islamism. Gamal Al-Bana, "La raha li-amrika ba'da al-yawm," Al-Masri Al-Yawm (Egypt), September 11, 2006, http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=29955 ; A. Dankowitz and Y. Feldner, MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 334, "Sheikh Gamal Al-Bana: Social and Religious Moderation vs. Political Extremism," March 16, 2007, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA33407#_edn25. Also see Shaker Al-Nabulsi, Sujun bi-la qudban, Beirut: Al-mu'assasa al-'arabiyya li'l-dirasat w'al-nashr, 2007, pp. 168-180. [10] www.almanar.com.lb, July 17, 2008. [11] Al-Hayat (London), June 23, 2008; www.almanar.com.lb, June 22, 2008. [12] 'Ali Muhammad Fakhru, "Al-naqd al-zalim li'l-muqawama al-'arabiyya," Al-Quds Al-'Arabi (London), May 15, 2008. [13] Hazem Saghieh, "Fi hija' al-silah w'al-muqawamat: tazawuj al-'adamiyya wa-wazifiyya la tahjubuha al-qadasa," Al-Hayat (London), June 21, 2007. [14] "Liqa' ma'a al-mufakkir al-duktur 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Eid hawla thalatha ayyam min al-tahqiq fi far' al-aman al-'askari (filastin) fi dimashq," http://middleeasttransparent.com/old/texts/abdelrazak_eid/abdelrazak_eid_interview.htm, March 21, 2006; "Liqa' ma'a al-mufakkir 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Eid hawla tahdid jaridat al-siria niyuz [Syria News] wa-radd bayan i'lan dimashq," http://www.free-syria.com/loadarticle.php?articleid=23565, November 7, 2007. [15] Jalal Al-'Azm, Al-Naqd al-dhati, pp. 91-110. [16] 'Abd Al-Razzaq 'Eid, "Sajn Fida' Hourani khatt watani ahmar," http://middleeasttransparent.com/article.php3?id_article=3002, December 31, 2007. [17] MEMRI Special Report No. 1897, "Iraqi Author 'Aref 'Alwan: The Jews Have an Historic Right to Palestine," April 15, 2008, http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD189708. [18] Elham Mane'a, "Man tuqawim ya Nasrallah," http://middleeasttransparent.com/article.php3?id_article=3839, May 11, 2008. [19] Saghieh, Al-Hayat (London), op. cit. [20] Basim Al-Ansar, "Mawt al-muqawama," www.elaph.com/Web/AsdaElaph/2008/8/354204.htm, August 5, 2008. [21] Ibrahim Al-Khayr Ibrahim, "Injazat al-muqawama al-islamiyya al-qawmiyya," www.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/ElaphWriter/2007/5/232596.htm, May 10, 2007. [22] Jamal Al-Khurasan, "Al-Muqawama min al-dhabh ila al-intiqam min al-jusur," www.elaph.com/ElaphWeb/AsdaElaph/2007/5/233335.htm, May 13, 2007. [23] Saghieh, Al-Hayat (London), op. cit. For Fanon on the national bourgeoisie, cf. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Presence Africaine, 1963, p. 121ff. [24] Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967, pp. 83-84. [25] Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 29-30. [26] www.almanar.com.lb, July 17, 2008. [27] Fakhru, "Al-Naqd al-zalim," op. cit. [28] Saghieh, Al-Hayat (London), op. cit. [29] Al-Ansar, "Mawt al-muqawama," op. cit. [30] Pierre 'Akel, "Fi inqilab Hasan Nasrallah wa-hizbihi 'ala al-sulta al-shar'iyya wa-mithaq 1943 wa-ittifaq al-ta'if - mujaddadan," www.middleeasttransparent.com/imprimer.php3?id_article=3824, May 9, 2008; reposting of article from July 17, 2006. [31] Al-Hayat (London), June 8, 2008.
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